电子科技大学经济与管理学院：海归老总-祝福还是诅咒？

 

　　本文研究任命海归作为中国上市公司的CEO们表现的影响。我们发现，海归老总的任命与低劣的性能，更低的市场反应和控制了选择偏差后，更频繁的监管执法行动有关。我们认为，CEO的国际专家在当地社会资本的机会成本取得的，比如政治关系和网络联系，这是经济转型与机构薄弱的关键。正如我们预测的负面影响时，社会资本是否到位，区域机构是强是其国际专长是需求消失。

 

　　曼彻斯特大学金融学博士,担任爱丁堡大学金融学准教授(Reader in Finance)，金融管理硕士项目主任，中国发展研究中心主任。曾经在杜伦大学担任助理教授，副教授。致力于公司金融和资本市场的研究，担任European Journal Finance副主编，曾担任Journal of Business Ethics, International Small Business Journal, Abacus等期刊的中国专刊主编。在国际主流学术期刊如The European Journal of Finance, Journal of Business Ethics, : International Review of Financial Analysis等上发表20余篇学术论文，由麦克米伦出版社出版4本专著。

 

　　原文：

 

　　This paper studies the impact of appointing returnees as CEOs on the performance of Chinese listed firms. We show that the appointment of returnee CEOs is associated with inferior performance, lower market reactions and more frequent regulatory enforcement actions after controlling for selection bias. We argue that CEOs’ international expertise is acquired at the opportunity cost of local social capital such as political connections and network ties, which are critical in transition economies with weak institutions. As we predict, the negative effect disappears when social capital is in place, regional institutions are strong or their international expertise is in demand.